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The job numbers in the United States and around the globe continue to look
bleak. Not only are the absolute numbers dismal, but also job growth has dragged
on with no hope for a substantial change in prospects. This situation supports the
view that we are facing a long-term problem that requires critical and creative
problem-solving responses. Since unemployment is the major cause of poverty,
many of our most pressing social problems are directly or indirectly related to job-
lessness.I argue that not only the quantity but also the quality of jobs is at issue.
One reason why the unemployment problem requires creative policy thinking is the
way in which employment interacts with other national and global concerns, such as the natural
environment. The currently prevalent “jobs versus the environment”mind-set needs to be replaced
with a “jobs and the environment” approach, but that approach presents challenges in framing
and limiting the range of potential solutions. As the recent Kyoto Protocol and ongoing discus-
sions make clear, economics can trump the environment, at least in the short term.What we need
now are some serious proposals that address the complex, complicated, and interrelated issues
regarding sustainable economic prosperity.
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Copyright © 2005 The Levy Economics InstituteFor the past eight years, a number of colleagues and I
have been involved in a project promoting a Public Service
Employment (PSE) policy with the potential to address not
only the problem of unemployment, but also environmental
sustainability and overall job quality (Forstater 1998, 1999a,
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). My purpose here is to introduce
our proposal and provide references that elaborate more fully
various aspects of it. The hope is to inspire greater discussion,
debate, and research among supporters of full employment
and ecological sustainability.
The Environment, Workplace, and 
Employment in Late Capitalism
The point of departure for my argument is that unregulated or
poorly regulated capitalism is both macroeconomically unsat-
isfactory and environmentally unsustainable, which provides
ample justification for a better policy. The key issue on the
macroeconomic side is the problem of involuntary unemploy-
ment. In addition, my concern is the quantity and quality of
jobs. Of course, these two aspects are related: significant
unemployment means less job security, which decreases over-
all job satisfaction, and firms are less likely to make improve-
ments in the workplace when jobs are scarce. An additional
challenge stems from the fact that even effective conventional
policy approaches to both unemployment and ecological
destruction are likely to exacerbate the problems. Full employ-
ment and environmental sustainability within conventional
frameworks seem to be incompatible goals.
Unemployment is not a simple problem. Involuntary
unemployment can result from deficiencies in aggregate
demand, as well as from structural and technological change.
John Maynard Keynes (1936) demonstrated that capitalism,
as a monetary production economy, is inherently demand-
constrained and results in involuntary unemployment—what
I call the effective demand problem. Even if this problem could
be rectified by government policy, changes in labor supply,
technologies, and the composition of final demand impose
intersectoral shifts in labor and capital that are unlikely to be
satisfied by market forces without unemployment and other
macro maladies (Lowe 1976, Pasinetti 1981, 1993). These
structural and technological obstacles to full employment
constitute what I call the structural change problem.
Just as policies addressing unemployment can cause fur-
ther damage to the environment and policies promoting envi-
ronmental sustainability can exacerbate unemployment,
policies addressing effective demand can exacerbate the struc-
tural change problem and vice versa. The reason for this is that
the structural change problem worsens at higher levels of
employment and capacity utilization, while the traditional
approach to dealing with structural rigidities promotes eco-
nomic flexibility through unemployment and excess capacity.
A private sector economy stimulated to full employment
via Keynesian demand management will experience bottle-
necks in production and other structural rigidities that result
in unemployment, inflation, and sluggish growth (Lowe
1976). Furthermore, Keynesian analysis does not recognize the
functionality of unemployment and excess capacity in capital-
ist economies. Firms plan reserve capacity in order to respond
to market changes, which leads to excess capacity at the indus-
try level and in the economy as a whole. Labor reserves are
created in the course of capital accumulation, so unemploy-
ment suppresses wages, disciplines workers, and provides
firms with a pool of workers when the economy expands.
Central banks demonstrate their understanding of functional
unemployment when they increase interest rates in response
to rising levels of employment and capacity utilization (Pollin
2000). Therefore, solutions to the unemployment problem
must address the issue of functionality.
Even if Keynesian demand management achieved full
employment, it would be environmentally destructive. There
are considerable obstacles to producing “green” products,
using cleaner technologies, and developing and implementing
alternative energy sources because competition compels firms
to base their decisions on minimizing private costs. Absent a
comprehensive environmental program, expanding the private
sector by Keynesian stimulus measures will assure increased
use of nonrenewable resources, more pollution, and the man-
ufacture of products with short life cycles that harm the envi-
ronment. Pumping up the private sector does not address the
issues regarding the composition of output and the technolog-
ical structure of production that are crucial for sustainability
(Mitchell 2000, p. 113, n. 8).
A comprehensive and sustainable program is necessary
before modern capitalist economies shift toward a sustainable
path. The biophysical and ecological conditions for a sustain-
able economy must satisfy certain “sustainability rules”regard-
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tion and the quantity and quality of emissions in relation to
local and global assimilative capacities, and must address issues
such as biodiversity loss, soil erosion, and deforestation
(Callenbach 1999, Holmberg et al. 1996, Lawn 2001, Prugh et
al. 2000). The program initiative has to address the technologi-
cal structure of production and the composition of production
and consumption. The initiative will be disruptive, as there will
be winners and losers—products, occupations, skills, technolo-
gies, firms, and industries may become obsolete and be
replaced by more competitive counterparts in a dynamic set-
ting. The structural and technological transformations will
exacerbate the structural change problem, which is already a
significant challenge in the absence of major environmental
policy programs. Furthermore, the absence of an effective full-
employment program during the initiative will likely exacer-
bate the unemployment problems of capitalist economies.
The approach to unemployment needs to address both
the effective demand and structural change problems, includ-
ing the functionality issue, and be compatible with environ-
mental sustainability. The question is whether flexible,
sustainable full employment is possible. I believe that a PSE
program can be designed to promote flexibility and sustain-
ability, and to serve as a vehicle for social policies that also
improve the workplace.
The Public Service Employment Program
The PSE program that I propose has been referred to as an
“employer of last resort” or “job guarantee” government pro-
gram (Wray 1998, Mitchell 2000). The federal government
would offer a PSE job to anyone ready and willing to work for
a basic PSE wage-benefits package. Program expenditures
would be permitted to increase the size of the federal govern-
ment’s budget deficit; i.e., the budget would be managed
according to the principles of functional finance (Lerner 1943,
Nell and Forstater 2003). This approach requires a “modern
money” system, i.e., a national fiat currency not fixed to a
commodity or another country’s currency (no gold standard,
currency board, “pegged” currency, or monetary union); in
other words, a floating exchange rate regime.
By creating an infinitely elastic demand curve for labor,
the PSE program acts as a strong countercyclical fiscal stabi-
lizer—the deficit grows when the economy contracts and
shrinks when the economy expands. Aggregate demand is
maintained at full, or nearly full, employment, with only the
proportion of PSE to private and regular public sector
employment changing over the business cycle. The program
thereby addresses the effective demand problem.
Successfully solving the effective demand problem can
exacerbate the structural change problem, however. High lev-
els of employment and capacity utilization can result in pro-
duction bottlenecks and other structural problems and
heighten inflationary pressures. This effect is the reason why
central banks, national governments, and international organ-
izations resist policies that promote full employment and try
to maintain a certain amount of excess capacity and a reserve
army of unemployed by, for example, raising interest rates.
Excess capacity provides additional system flexibility and
enables capital accumulation that is otherwise foregone due to
structural rigidities. As noted earlier, a reserve army of unem-
ployed helps to suppress wages, discipline workers, and pro-
vide a pool of labor during an economic expansion.
Unlike traditional Keynesian demand management, the
PSE approach also addresses the structural change problem
and recognizes the functionality of unemployment. Offering
the unemployed jobs in the PSE sector permits full employ-
ment without the rigidities associated with full employment in
the private sector. PSE program activities can be designed to
avoid structural bottlenecks, while the program itself main-
tains a “reserve” of labor for the private sector without the
social and economic costs of unemployment and thus
addresses the functionality issue. In fact, the program, by
maintaining and enhancing skills and knowledge, may per-
form this function more effectively than a reserve of unem-
ployed, which leads to de-skilling and, perhaps, more
unemployment.
In terms of the relative bargaining power of capital and
labor (e.g., how unemployment impacts wages and discipline),
a PSE program can affect both sides of the negotiating table.
Workers will always have the option of taking a PSE job, while
firms will always have the option of hiring from the PSE pool.
As explained below, a PSE program can be designed to pro-
mote better wages and working conditions.
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There are two important ways that a PSE program can pro-
mote environmental sustainability. First, since PSE activities
do not seek profits, the activities are designed and evaluated
according to social, macro, or environmental efficiency criteria
rather than cost-minimizing,“efficiency”criteria of the private
sector. My suggestion is akin to E. F. Schumacher’s (1973)
“appropriate technology”: more labor-intensive methods of
production may make sense even when more capital-intensive
methods are available. PSE activities can be designed to use
fewer natural resources, cause less pollution, and reduce eco-
logical damage. Even if the activities were environmentally
neutral, the outcome would be more sustainable than a private
sector stimulated to full employment. Moreover, PSE activities
can be designed to perform environmental services. For exam-
ple,a Green Jobs Corps could sustain the ecology in a variety of
ways: community and industrial recycling, improved insulation
for residential and commercial structures, carpooling, rooftop
gardening and urban landscaping, solar energy applied to the
public infrastructure (e.g., streetlights, schools, construction
warning signs, billboards), monitoring and enforcement, envi-
ronmental education, and research support (see Forstater 2002,
2003 for an expanded discussion of these ways).
Most activities do not require highly specialized skills, and
the “learning by doing” effects could be considerable, as skills
acquired by participants could be applied in the private sector,
and this succession would further promote sustainability. In
addition, increased awareness of environmental and ecological
issues by participants and the public would change consump-
tion patterns, which is vital for long-term sustainability.
Public Employment and the Workplace
A PSE approach to full employment and price stability can
serve as the basis for social policy in the workplace, particu-
larly when it comes to the issues that have been difficult to
influence through direct legislation. To understand how this
might work, consider that workers would always have the
option to take a PSE job. Now imagine what would happen in
a country like the United States, which lacks universal health
care, if the PSE wage-benefits package included health insur-
ance. Market pressures would encourage employers in the pri-
vate sector to match the package or compensate employees in
another way, such as with higher salaries or greater opportuni-
ties for career advancement. The alternative is that employers
risk losing their workers to the PSE program.
Similarly, since the PSE wage would be the de facto mini-
mum wage, an increase in the PSE wage would pressure pri-
vate firms to offer higher wages or other compensation. The
same rationale holds for child care, worker health-and-safety
issues, administration and grievance issues, and virtually every
aspect of the workplace.As a benchmark for the economy, PSE
employment would increase the quality of private and public
sector jobs.
Functional Finance and Ecological Tax Reform
A PSE program based on the principles of functional finance
can be combined effectively with ecological tax reform to fur-
ther environmental sustainability. The functional finance
approach to budgetary policy is appropriate for a “modern
money” economy (Forstater 1999b, Nell and Forstater 2003).
Modern money is state fiat (Chartalist) money that operates
with flexible exchange rates and is not backed by a commodity
or tied to another currency (Lerner 1947, Bell and Nell 2003).
Functional finance, as formulated by Abba Lerner (1943),
means that government spending, lending, borrowing, taxing,
buying, and selling should be judged only by the effects of such
actions on the economy and society, rather than by the tenets
of “sound finance.” No particular relationship between gov-
ernment spending and tax revenues, for example, is good or
bad independently of a fiscal stance’s effect on the economy.
The effect of a budget deficit depends on the economic condi-
tions at the time and the goals of society.
It has been shown that under a modern money system,
neither taxes nor bonds finance government spending (Bell
2000), but these options have other purposes. The purpose of
taxation is “its effects on the public of influencing their eco-
nomic behavior” (Lerner 1951, p. 131, original emphasis). The
purpose of bond sales is to manage bank reserves and short-
term interest rates (Lerner 1943, p. 355).
Taxes are intended to modify two broad categories of
behavior. First, taxes (and the requirement that government
currency satisfy tax liabilities) create a demand for state
money. This is what is meant by a “tax-driven money” system
(Wray 1998). People accept state currency in exchange for
goods and services (or as a means of settling debt) because
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they need to pay taxes or know that others who need to pay
taxes will accept it, and so on. Second, taxes modify undesir-
able behavior when they are levied on unhealthy products or
technologies in order to discourage people from purchasing
items or engaging in certain activities. This kind of tax is not
intended to raise revenue, but to influence behavior. Likewise,
tax credits or subsidies are also intended to influence behavior.
Ecological tax reform (including subsidies, quotas, and
other incentive-based regulations) fits very nicely into the
functional finance framework. An ecological economist’s dis-
tinction between money (accounting information not subject
to the laws of physics) and real resources (which are subject to
biophysical limits) is also consistent with the functional
finance perspective (Daly 1996, pp. 178ff), although some
“sound finance” conclusions are not consistent with func-
tional finance.
Ecological tax reform begins from the premise that cur-
rent tax and regulatory structures of most modern countries
are not consistent with ecological sustainability. Current taxes
tend to discourage behaviors that should be encouraged and
vice versa. For example, taxes on income and employment dis-
courage work and job formation, while low tax rates and sub-
sidies for resource extraction and “dirty” technologies
encourage pollution and resource depletion. In some cases,
taxes or tax breaks may encourage the right behavior but are
insufficient, or need to be coupled with complementary poli-
cies, to produce a comprehensive effect. A functional finance
approach to ecological tax reform could begin with the elimi-
nation of federal payroll and income taxes and the adoption of
certain property taxes. Taxes, tax credits, subsidies, quotas,
licenses, low-interest loans, and other regulatory policies could
penalize unsustainable behaviors and reward green ones.
This is not the place for a comprehensive outline of eco-
logical tax reform, as functional finance and ecological tax
reform are discussed in detail elsewhere (Forstater 2002,
2003). My objective is to encourage ecological tax reform, as
outlined above, and to rid proposals of “sound finance” prin-
ciples. Integrating functional finance and ecological tax
reform would assist in the shift to a path where both full
employment and ecological sustainability are possible.
Conclusion
Modern capitalism fails to provide full employment, enough
high quality jobs, or ecological sustainability. These problems
are not going to go away, but will likely become progressively
more difficult to cope with and to solve. Unemployment and
underemployment are responsible for many of our most
pressing economic and social problems, while degradation of
the natural environment threatens human survival itself.
A PSE program based on principles of functional finance
can be designed to address these problems, and I have outlined
some of the logic behind such a program. It is imperative that
economists earnestly explore the possibilities for an economi-
cally and ecologically sustainable society. Now is the time to
discuss and debate policies that address the critical issues con-
cerning the environment, the workplace, and employment.
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